External Migration and Asylum Management: Accountability for Executive Action Outside EU-territory by Rijpma, J.J.
 European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu ISSN 2499-8249 
Vol. 2, 2017, No 2, pp. 571-596  doi: 10.15166/2499-8249/169 
 
Articles 
Special Section – The New Frontiers of EU Adminis-
trative Law: Is There an Accountability Gap in EU 
External Relations? 
 
 
 
External Migration and Asylum Management: 
Accountability for Executive Action 
Outside EU-territory  
 
 
Jorrit J. Rijpma* 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: I. Introduction. – II. EU visa policy. – II.1. Judicial review of decisions. – II.2. Judicial re-
view in case of representation. – II.3. Humanitarian visa. – II.4. The extra-territorial applicability of the 
Charter. – III. Refugee resettlement. – III.1. EU Resettlement initiatives. – III.2. Resettlement in the refugee 
crisis. – III.3. Proposal for an EU resettlement mechanism. – III.4. Applicability of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights to EU resettlement. – IV. Frontex coordinated joint operations in third country territory. – 
IV.1. Frontex as an executive actor. – IV.2. Responsibility for fundamental rights violations. – IV.3. Funda-
mental rights accountability mechanisms. – IV.4. Frontex as an external executive actor. – IV.5. Accounta-
bility for fundamental rights violations on third country territory. – V. Conclusion. 
 
ABSTRACT: EU migration and asylum law, an area of administrative law par excellence, has from the 
moment that the EU acquired competences in this field, had a very strong external dimension. By 
looking at three areas of EU migration and asylum policy: visa policy, refugee resettlement and 
border management through Frontex operational activity, it will be shown that, notwithstanding 
significant improvements, a restrictive interpretation of the scope of EU law and the multi-level 
structure of EU executive action continue to pose challenges in holding the EU and its Member 
States to account. 
 
KEYWORDS: EU migration and asylum policy – external dimension – executive action – Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union – accountability mechanisms – cooperation with third 
countries. 
 
 
* Jean Monnet Professor ad personam, Europa Institute, Leiden Law School, 
j.j.rijpma@law.leidenuniv.nl. 
572 Jorrit J. Rijpma 
I. Introduction 
EU migration and asylum law, an area of administrative law par excellence, has from 
the moment that the EU acquired competences in this field, had a very strong external 
dimension. This external dimension has been shaped both by legally binding instru-
ments (EU legislation, international agreements), as well as by instruments of a less 
than clear legal value (mobility partnerships, action plans and memoranda of under-
standing).1 One could group the EU-Turkey Statement in response to the 2015 refugee 
crisis into the latter category. Although broadly reported as an agreement between the 
EU and Turkey, the General Court has recently ruled that, without pronouncing itself on 
the legal nature of the “deal”, it was in any case concluded by the Member States rather 
than the EU.2 
In the field of migration and asylum, the EU’s integrated administration, through 
which EU law is implemented by the EU’s institutions, bodies and agencies, as well as 
the Member States’ competent authorities, is mirrored externally.3 Likewise, the imple-
mentation of EU law may take the form of legally binding decision making, such as the 
handling of individual visa applications, but it may also take place through more factual 
executive action, such as the joint patrolling against human smuggling and the training 
of third country border guards. The often unclear division of responsibilities between 
Member States and EU actors, including EU agencies such as the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), is 
amplified in the external domain where executive action is often supported by, or car-
ried out in cooperation with, international organisations, such as the International Or-
ganization for Migration (IOM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), or with third country authorities.  
In the field of migration and asylum, States have often resorted to externalisation in 
an attempt to prevent access to territory, allowing them to evade administrative and 
constitutional safeguards, as well as international obligations at home, whilst simulta-
neously co-opting third countries in achieving their own policy objectives.4 Externalisa-
tion often amounts to a policy of deterrence, stopping third country nationals from 
 
1 J.J. RIJPMA, M. CREMONA, The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of Law, in 
EUI Working Paper Series, no. 1, 2007.  
2 EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, in European Council Press Release 144/16 of 18 March 
2016. On the question of whether the agreement is to be considered an agreement under public interna-
tional law: M. DEN HEIJER, T. SPIJKERBOER, Is the EU-Turkey refugee and migration deal a treaty?, in EU Law 
Analysis, 7 April 2016, eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl; General Court, orders of 28 February 2017, cases T-
192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 T-192/16, NF, NG and MN v European Council (appeals have been lodged 
before the Court of Justice, cases C-208/17 P, C-209/17 P and C-210/17 P). 
3 H. HOFMANN, Mapping the European Administrative Space, in West European Politics, 2008, p. 662 
et seq. 
4 S. LAVANEX, Shifting up and out: The foreign policy of European immigration control, in West Euro-
pean Politics, 2006, p. 329 et seq. 
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reaching EU territory and preventing them from entering into direct contact with EU or 
Member States’ authorities. Rather than a strategy for migration control, it is often pre-
sented in terms of security and/or humanitarian concerns.5 This holds true also for in-
stance for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Mission Operation Sophia, as well as 
for the EU-Turkey Statement, both claiming to target human smuggling and to prevent 
people from undertaking dangerous journeys.6  
As EU and Member States’ authorities increasingly act themselves on third country 
territory, on the basis of EU legislation and/or agreements concluded by the EU with 
third countries, there is room for greater scrutiny of the executive action in this area. 
The European Court of Human Rights, already early on, made it clear that it would not 
allow a Contracting Party to engage in conduct in contravention of the European Con-
vention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) outside 
its own territory.7 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) 
provides for even greater opportunities to control the actions of the EU bodies and 
agencies, as well as the Member States when they act outside EU territory but within 
the scope of EU law. In addition, non-judicial remedies are developed to ensure compli-
ance with fundamental rights.  
This Article will illustrate the above by looking at three areas of EU migration and 
asylum policy with a strong external dimension: visa policy, refugee resettlement and 
border management through Frontex operational activity.8 In all three areas there have 
been recent political, legislative or judicial developments, which shed light on the scru-
tiny of EU external action in the field of migration and asylum law, from the perspective 
of the individual. EU external action is understood in this context as the implementation 
of EU law outside the territory of the Member States, be this by EU institutions or agen-
cies, or by Member States’ authorities. It will be shown that, notwithstanding significant 
improvements, a restrictive interpretation of the scope of EU law and the multi-level 
structure of EU executive action make it difficult to hold the EU or its Member States ac-
countable for possible wrongdoings. This difficulty is exacerbated in the external field, 
due to the involvement of non-EU actors and the fact that those affected are generally 
non-EU citizens who find themselves outside EU territory, which may practically impede 
their access to accountability mechanisms.  
 
5 B. FRELICK, M. KYSEL, J. PODKUL, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of 
Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, in Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2016, p. 193. 
6 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED). 
7 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 16 November 2004, no. 31821/96, Issa et al. v. Tur-
key, para. 71. 
8 Hence no attention will be paid to CFSP missions with (secondary) migration and asylum manage-
ment objectives or executive action by the Member States that has no link with the EU’s migration and 
asylum policy.  
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II. EU visa policy 
The EU’s visa policy is a clear example of “remote policing”, aimed at preventing the arrival 
of unwanted third country nationals, supported by the private enforcement of carrier 
sanctions.9 Third countries whose nationals are under an obligation to obtain a visa to vis-
it the Schengen area are listed in Regulation 539/2001.10 The rules and conditions govern-
ing the issuance of visas were laid down in a regulation in 2009, the Visa Code.11 A Visa 
Information System (VIS), technically supporting the visa application process and register-
ing a set of applicants’ data, including fingerprints, has been up and running since 2011.12  
ii.1. Judicial review of decisions 
The Common Consular Instructions, the predecessor of the Visa Code, gave consular 
authorities considerable discretion in their decision of whether or not to grant a visa, 
allowing also for national rules to supplement the reasons for denying a visa.13 This 
changed with the advent of the Visa Code, which was specifically intended to improve 
the rights of third country nationals in the visa application process.14 Art. 32 of the Visa 
Code now contains an exhaustive list of, admittedly broadly formulated, criteria which 
Member States are not allowed to supplement, as was held by the Court of Justice in 
the Koushkaki case.15 
The Visa Code also introduced a right of appeal against the refusal, revocation or 
annulment of a visa, although not against decisions of non-admissibility.16 Art. 23, para. 
3, of the Visa Code provides for this right against the Member State that has taken the 
final decision on the application and in accordance with the national law of that Mem-
ber State. National laws are however subject to Art. 47, para. 1, of the Charter, which 
 
9 D. BIGO, E. GUILD, Policing at Distance: Schengen Visa Policies, in D. BIGO, E. GUILD (eds), Controlling 
Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 234. 
10 Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of the Council of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nation-
als must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are ex-
empt from that requirement. 
11 Regulation (EC) 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establish-
ing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). 
12 Regulation (EC) 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas 
(VIS Regulation). 
13 Common Consular Instructions on Visas for Diplomatic Mission and Consular Posts, part V, point 2.4. 
14 A. MELONI, The Community Code on Visas: Harmonisation at Last?, in European Law Review, 2009, 
p. 671 et seq. 
15 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 December 2013, case C-84/12, Koushkaki [GC], para. 55. 
16 This Article will focus on the review of the decision on the application for a Schengen visa, not on 
the provision on the protection of personal data under the VIS, although here as well the fact that the 
data subject is outside EU territory may lead to similar problems in terms of access to justice. 
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states that anybody “whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal”. 
Art. 47 of the Charter is based on Art. 13 of the ECHR. However, where the ECHR re-
fers to a remedy before a national authority, the Charter provides for more protection 
by requiring an effective remedy before a court.17 Accordingly, the European Commis-
sion in 2014 started infringement proceedings against a number of Member States, af-
ter which most amended their national laws.18 In the meantime, the question of wheth-
er the provision requires Member States to provide for a right of appeal before a court 
of law, rather than an administrative body, has reached the Court of Justice by way of a 
preliminary reference from Poland, one of the Member States that continues to exclude 
judicial review.19 Although one could argue that there is no substantive right to a visa, it 
should be recalled that the Court in Koushkaki held that, despite the large discretion 
that Member States retain in applying the provisions of the Visa Code, they cannot re-
fuse a visa on grounds not provided for in that Code.20  
Moreover, as regards the scope of the appeal, in the Zakaria case the Court of Jus-
tice was asked whether the right to appeal a refusal of entry under the Schengen Bor-
ders Code should include a right to challenge the way in which checks were conducted 
and, if not, whether this would infringe Art. 47 of the Charter. In that case, a third coun-
try national did not wish to appeal the refusal of entry, but rather the way in which he 
had been treated by national border guards, which he alleged had infringed his funda-
mental rights. The Court made it very clear that if a situation falls within the scope of EU 
law Member States ought to provide for appropriate legal remedies for infringement of 
fundamental rights.21 
ii.2. Judicial review in case of representation 
An application for a Schengen visa should be made at the consulate of the Schengen 
Member State of (main) destination or, in the absence thereof, the Member State of 
first entry.22 Art. 8 of the Visa Code provides Member States with the possibility of con-
cluding bilateral representation arrangements and stipulates that Member States shall 
 
17 The Court of Justice enshrined that right as a general principle of Union law in its judgment of 15 
May 1986, case 222/84, Johnston, paras 18-19.  
18 A. MELONI, Visa Code Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, in K. HAILBRONNER, D. THYM (eds), EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law – A Commentary, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016, p. 169. 
19 Court of Justice, request for a preliminary ruling lodged on 19 July 2016, case C-403/16, El Hassani. 
20 See also the Opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 7 February 2017, case C-638/16 PPU, X and X, 
para. 82, with reference to Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-
493/10, N. S. et al. [GC], paras 68 and 69. 
21 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 January 2013, case C-23/12, Zakaria, para. 40. 
22 Art. 5 of the Visa Code. 
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endeavor to do so in countries where they do not have consular services.23 It provides 
that where the representing Member State considers refusing a visa, the visa applica-
tion will be referred to the represented Member State in order for it to take the final de-
cision.24 However, Art. 8, para. 4, let. d), allows for a derogation from this obligation to 
consult with the represented Member State. Under the Commission proposal for a re-
cast of the Visa Code, this obligation would be deleted in full.25 
A number of Dutch courts have held that where the representation agreement does 
not provide for consultation with the represented Member State – in the cases at hand 
the Netherlands – appeal against a refusal lies with the representing Member State.26 
Moreover, the obligation under Dutch law to refer an administrative appeal to the cor-
rect authority in case it is wrongly directed at another administrative authority does not 
apply.27 This raises questions regarding the right to effective judicial protection guaran-
teed by Art. 47 of the Charter and principles of good administration.28 This right applies 
to everyone within the scope of the Charter, including third-country nationals whose 
legal position is regulated by EU law, even if they have not (yet) been issued a permit to 
stay.29 The same holds true for the right to good administration, which – although in-
cluded under the heading of citizens’ rights – applies to everyone within the scope of 
the Charter. Although the right is directed at the EU institutions and bodies, it applies as 
a general principle also to the Member States when they implement EU law.30  
Considering that the Commission’s proposal for a recast removes the possibility for 
involvement in the procedure by the represented Member State, it seems all the more 
opportune to ask the Court of Justice for clarification. From the perspective of mutual 
recognition and trust – that underpin the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – differ-
 
23 Under the Commission’s recast proposal of 2014, in the absence of a consulate of the responsible 
Member State, the applicant may apply at any of the other Schengen consulates present (“mandatory 
representation”). See Art. 5 of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code) (recast), COM(2014) 164 final. 
24 Art. 8, para. 2, of the Visa Code.  
25 Art. 39 of the Proposal for a Regulation COM(2014) 164. 
26 District Court of The Hague, judgment of 3 April 2013, No. AWB 12/34042; District Court of The 
Hague (Roermond seat), judgment of 9 December 2011, No. AWB 11/119995. 
27 District Court of The Hague, judgment of 24 April 2013, No. AWB 12/30040. 
28 E. BROUWER, Wanneer een staat een visum weigert namens een andere staat – Vertegenwoordig-
ingsafspraken in het EU-visumbeleid en het recht op effectieve rechtsbescherming, in Tijdschrift voor Eu-
ropees en Economisch Recht, 2015, p. 164 et seq.; see also Meijers Committee, Response to the Open 
Consultation – Improving procedures for obtaining short-stay ‘Schengen’ visas, 17 June 2013, 
www.commissie-meijers.nl. 
29 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 November 2012, case C-277/11, M.; Zakaria, cit. 
30 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 July 2014, joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, Y.S. and M.S., para. 
68. The scope of the Charter and that of general principles in as far as they apply to the Member States is 
the same, whenever they act within the scope of EU law: see Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 
2013, case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [GC], para. 21. 
External Migration and Asylum Management: Accountability for Executive Action 577 
ences in national rules applying to the appeal should not necessarily be problematic or 
amount to a violation of fundamental rights. However, one could image that in accord-
ance with the Court’s case law in N.S., that presumption of mutual trust is rebuttable.31 
Also, it could well be that in line with the Court’s case law in C.K. et al., there may be specif-
ic personal circumstances in which the appeal should lie with the represented Member 
State. This could be the case where the absence of legal aid, for instance as regards the 
provision of translations, would unreasonably impede applicants’ access to justice.32 
ii.3. Humanitarian visa 
Art. 25 of the Visa Code allows Member States to exceptionally issue a visa with a lim-
ited territorial validity on humanitarian grounds. This provision became central to the 
discussion on humanitarian visas as a means of allowing refugees from conflict-ridden 
countries a safe passage to Europe. It was argued that the provision on territorially-
limited Schengen visas allowed for the introduction of a humanitarian visa on a larger 
scale.33 In Belgium, in a number of cases that were the subject of much media coverage, 
the argument was made – and initially accepted by the Belgian judge – that Art. 4 of the 
Charter not only allowed but even required that a Schengen visa be issued on humani-
tarian grounds to Syrian applicants fleeing the civil war in their home country.34  
In one of these cases, X and X, preliminary questions were referred to the Court of 
Justice, in essence asking whether indeed under the Visa Code there is an obligation for 
the Member States to issue a territorially limited Schengen visa, where there is a risk 
that the applicants will otherwise fall victim to torture or inhumane or degrading treat-
ment.35 The case concerned a family from Aleppo (Syria), that had travelled to and from 
Beirut (Lebanon) in order to apply at the Belgian Embassy for visas with limited territo-
rial validity. The visas would allow them to leave Syria and seek asylum in Belgium. 
Contrary to the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court argued that the delivery of a 
humanitarian visa for the purpose of requesting asylum did not fall within the scope of 
EU law and hence not within the scope of the Charter. It ruled that the request made by 
the Syrian family was a request for a long-term visa, which had not been harmonised at 
EU level and therefore remained within the remit of the Member States’ competences.36 
The Court added that to conclude otherwise would enable third country nationals to 
 
31 N. S. et al. [GC], cit. 
32 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 February 2017, case C-578/16 PPU, C.K. et al. 
33 See e.g. U.I. JENSEN, Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation?, Study for the LIBE Committee of the 
European Parliament, 2014, www.europarl.europa.eu, and S. PEERS, Do potential asylum-seekers have the 
right to a Schengen visa?, in EU Law Analysis, 20 January 2014, eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl. 
34 VRT, Asylum secretary rejects visa for Aleppo Syrians, in Flandersnews.be, 27 October 2016, dere-
dactie.be. 
35 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 March 2017, case C-638/16 PPU, X and X [GC]. 
36 Ibid., paras 42-45. 
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request asylum outside the EU, which the EU asylum acquis excludes, and would de fac-
to amend the laws on international protection in the Member States.37 The Court thus 
seemed to reaffirm one of the principles of the global refugee system, namely the terri-
toriality of that regime, which requires an asylum seeker to be outside her own country 
and which does not impose obligations on Member States outside their own borders.  
The Court’s reasoning has been criticised for bringing the applicants outside the 
scope of the Visa Code on the basis of the purpose for which they requested the visa. 
As the Advocate General argued, the applicants’ intention cannot alter the nature or 
purpose of their application, nor can it convert their claim into an application for a long-
term visa, thereby placing them outside the scope of the Visa Code and EU law more 
generally.38 Moreno-Lax draws a comparison between the position of visa applicants 
and asylum seekers who, under a similar reasoning, would be excluded from the remit 
of the asylum directives upon a negative decision on their request.39  
The Court’s decision is, however, consistent with earlier cases such as Iida40 and 
Ymeraga,41 which were also invoked by the intervening Member States. In those cases, 
the Court held that the Charter did not apply to a refusal to grant a residence permit to 
a third country national family member because the third country nationals in question 
did not satisfy the conditions for the grant of that card. The Advocate General sought to 
distinguish these cases, arguing that the Syrian family in the X and X case did fall within 
the material and personal scope of the Visa Code, being of a nationality requiring a visa 
to cross the Schengen external border.42 The Court, however, reached its conclusion 
without referring to either the Advocate General’s Opinion or its previous case law.  
In theory, the Belgian authorities could have made a distinction between non-
admissibility (for having submitted the wrong application) and refusal (for posing a risk 
of not returning home upon expiry of the visa). In both cases the outcome would likely 
be based on the invocation of Art. 4 of the Charter, as the request for a visa in order to 
seek protection in the Member State of destination will be considered to indicate that 
the applicants intend to stay for more than three months. Against a non-admissibility 
decision, the Visa Code would not have granted an appeal possibility, whereas against a 
refusal it does. Still, it should be remembered that the exclusion of the possibility of ap-
peal against admissibility decisions has been criticised.43 More important, issuing an 
 
37 Ibid., para. 49. 
38 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, X and X, cit., para. 50. 
39 V. MORENO-LAX, Asylum Visas as an Obligation under EU Law: Case PPU C-638/16 X, X v État belge 
(Part I), in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 16 February 2017, eumigrationlawblog.eu. 
40 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 November 2012, case C-40/11, Iida. 
41 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 May 2013, case C-87/12, Ymeraga. 
42 X and X [GC], cit., paras 58-60. 
43 A. MELONI, The Community Code on Visas, cit., p. 692. 
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admissibility decision could itself be considered an application of the Visa Code, thereby 
bringing the action within the scope of EU law and therefore the remit of the Charter.  
If anything, the Court’s decision to exclude the facts of the case from the scope of 
application of the Charter was motivated by its wish not to intervene in a highly sensi-
tive area, aware of the potentially far-reaching consequences for Member States’ pro-
tection systems. It was the ambiguity of the notion of the scope of EU law, which deter-
mines the application of the Charter, that allowed it to do so.  
ii.4. The extra-territorial applicability of the Charter 
Whereas Art. 1 of the ECHR clearly limits the territorial scope of the Convention to the 
contracting parties’ territory, and the Strasbourg case law limits its extra-territorial ef-
fect to situations of effective control, similar restrictions do not exist as regards the 
Charter. In the X and X case, the Court confirmed that “the question is not to identify an 
independent field of application of the Charter, but to determine the remit of EU law 
and its relevance to a particular situation”.44  
The Court and the Advocate General may have differed on the outcome of the case, 
but they did so on the basis of a differing assessment of whether the situation at hand 
fell within the scope of EU law. They did not, at least not openly, disagree on the conclu-
sion that once a situation falls within the scope of EU law, the Charter applies, be it in-
ternally or externally. AG Mengozzi was very explicit in his Opinion that Member State 
authorities acting in the context of EU law are required to observe the Charter, irrespec-
tive of any territorial criterion or the legal situation of the persons to which it applies.45 
As regards the content of the rights contained in the Charter, AG Mengozzi recalled that, 
whilst the Charter follows the level of protection of the ECHR, nothing prevents the Un-
ion from providing more extensive protection.46 
The EU is bound by the Charter “whenever it exercises its competences, both inter-
nally and externally, either directly or through the intermediation of the Member States 
‘implementing EU law’”.47 Moreover, the EU’s institutions, bodies and agencies remain 
bound by the Charter, also when they act outside the EU legal framework.48 The follow-
 
44 V. MORENO-LAX, C. COSTELLO, The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD 
(eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 1680. 
45 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, X and X, cit., para. 89. Compare the Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 
13 September 2016, case C-104/16 P, Front Polisario, paras 270-272.  
46 Art. 52, para. 3, of the Charter. Opinion of AG Mengozzi, X and X, cit., para. 99. 
47 V. MORENO-LAX, C. COSTELLO, The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, cit., p. 1682. 
48 As was the case of the Commission in the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding with Mem-
ber States such as Cyprus within the context of the financial crisis: Court of Justice, judgment of 20 Sep-
tember 2016, joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising [GC], para. 67. 
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ing two examples, relating to resettlement and cooperation on border management, 
may serve to illustrate how the Charter can play a role in ensuring the compatibility of 
external action by the EU and its Member States’ executive authorities. However, they 
will also show how the definition of scope of EU law continues to raise questions, as 
does the multi-actor nature of the EU’s external executive action. 
III. Refugee resettlement 
Refugee resettlement has been defined as the “selection and transfer of refugees from 
a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit 
them – as refugees – with permanent residence status”.49 Refugee settlement serves as 
a protection tool and an expression of international solidarity, allowing for a durable 
solution for refugees and alleviating the pressure on refugee receiving countries.50 The 
UNHCR plays an important role in resettlement. UNHCR identifies refugees in need of 
resettlement as part of its mandate and refers them for consideration to States that are 
willing to offer permanent residence. 
In addition to persons that fall under the definition of the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion,51 persons in need of subsidiary protection – due to serious and indiscriminate 
threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalised violence or 
events seriously disturbing public order – also fall within its mandate. Determination as 
a refugee under UNHCR’s mandate is a precondition to be considered by States for re-
settlement.52 UNHCR divides its resettlement submissions by category (including cate-
gories of particularly vulnerable refugees, such as women and children at risk, as well as 
torture victims) and priority level (emergency, urgent and normal).53 
There is no obligation on States to allow for resettlement, which is therefore con-
sidered a voluntary and discretionary act of benevolence. States will normally engage in 
a further examination of the files of the individuals that have been pre-selected by 
UNHCR or engage in on-the-spot interviews. Some States impose additional require-
ments – such as the chance of successful integration in the resettlement State – or en-
gage in extensive background checks. Nonetheless, recent figures show that the large 
majority of refugees referred by the UNHCR (91,8 percent) are accepted by resettlement 
countries.54 This makes the initial Refugee Status Determination (RSD) by the UNCHR of 
paramount importance for the individuals concerned. 
 
49 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, Geneva, July 2011, www.unhcr.org, p. 3. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Art. 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951. 
52 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, cit., p. 21.  
53 Ibid., p. 245 et seq. 
54 UNHCR, Global Resettlement Needs, 2017, www.unhcr.org, p. 63. 
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Alexander concluded in 1999 that the UNHCR RSD procedures lagged behind devel-
opments in administrative and human rights law.55 In September 2005, the UNHCR pub-
lished a manual on Procedural Standards for RSD under the UNHCR’s mandate, which 
significantly improved asylum seekers’ rights, introducing the duty to state reasons and 
the possibility to appeal a negative RSD decision with another protection office.56 Still 
UNHCR appears to operate below international standards, as well as its own position on a 
fair and effective RSD procedure for States.57 The lack of procedural safeguards has been 
replicated at the stage of State examination of UNHCR referrals for resettlement. On oc-
casion EU Member States have refused resettlement without stating reasons, making it 
difficult for the UNCHR to refer the individual in question to another State. 
Resettlement is increasingly seen as a means of providing a safe pathway to refu-
gee protection, and promoted by the UNHCR as such. However, it must be stressed that 
resettlement cannot be a substitute for national asylum procedures, since there is no 
obligation for States to allow for resettlement. Only in its most extensive form, where a 
full asylum procedure is provided for outside national territory followed by a transfer to 
the asylum granting State, does resettlement overlap with the notion of extra-territorial 
processing.58 Arguably, it also gives UNHCR a role that it was never intended to play, 
shifting responsibility from States to the UN.59 
iii.1. EU resettlement initiatives 
A majority of EU Member States have in one way or another engaged in resettlement, 
either on an ad hoc basis or in the framework of more structured programmes, both 
with and without the involvement of the UNHCR. However, national rules on resettle-
ment remain diverse both in form and substance.60  
Member States have proven to be unreceptive to harmonisation attempts, empha-
sising the political nature of the decision to resettle. As a result, EU initiatives in this 
field have consisted primarily of the provision of financial support under the European 
Refugee Fund (ERF), running from 2008-2013, and its successor the Asylum, Migration 
 
55 M. ALEXANDER, Refugee Status Determination Conducted by the UNHCR, in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 1999, p. 251 et seq. 
56 UNHCR, Procedural Standards for Refugee Standard Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate, 20 
November 2003, www.unhcr.org. 
57 M. KAGAN, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection Challenges Posed by UNHCR Refugee Status 
Determination, in International Journal of Refugee Law, 2006, pp. 23 and 27. 
58 Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, External Processing: conditions applying to the 
processing of asylum applications outside the European Union, Advisory Report no. 32, December 2010, 
acvz.org, p. 49. 
59 M. KAGAN, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper, cit., p. 4. 
60 D. PERRIN, F. MCNAMARA, Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity 
in Legal and Policy Frames, EUI Research Report 2013/03, www.migrationpolicycentre.eu. 
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and Integration Fund (AMIF) running until 2020.61 In 2012, a decision to amend the ERF 
established the Joint EU resettlement programme, under which the Commission adopts 
annual common Union resettlement priorities.62 This has been taken over in the AMIF. 
Administrative cooperation is supported by the EASO, which has the competence to 
“coordinate exchanges of information and other actions on resettlement taken by 
Member States”, as well as the European Resettlement Network, an initiative co-funded 
by the AMIF and involving also the UNHCR and the IOM.63  
Resettlement initiatives by the EU, which are aimed at bringing over refugees from 
outside the Union, should be distinguished from pilot projects aimed at transferring 
recognized refugees from one Member State to another as a means of intra-EU solidari-
ty.64 Likewise resettlement should be distinguished from relocation, which refers to the 
transfer of asylum seekers from one Member States to another, together with the re-
sponsibility for their asylum claim, again as a means of intra-EU solidarity.65  
iii.2. Resettlement in the refugee crisis 
It was the refugee crisis that prompted Member States to further increase and coordinate 
their resettlement efforts. Representatives of the Governments of Member States meet-
ing within the Council on 20 July 2015 committed to resettling 20.000 people.66 On top of 
this, the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 added a commitment from the Member 
States to resettle another Syrian from Turkey to the Member States, for every Syrian re-
admitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, within the framework of the existing com-
 
61 Decision 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing 
the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows; Art. 17 of Regulation (EU) 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund. 
62 Decision 281/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 2012 amending 
Decision No 573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of 
the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. 
63 Art. 7 of Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
establishing a European Asylum Support Office. 
64 See for instance EU Pilot Projects on Intra-EU Relocation from Malta (EUREMA), implemented un-
der ERF Community Actions. 
65 Relocation was decided upon by the Council during the 2015 refugee crisis as an emergency 
measure under Art. 78, para. 3, TFEU. Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of the Council of 14 September 2015 es-
tablishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of 
Greece and Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of the Council of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
66 Conclusions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council on resettling through multilateral and national schemes 20 000 persons in clear need of interna-
tional protection, Brussels, 22 July 2015, Council document 11130/15. See also the Commission Recom-
mendation C(2015) 3560 final of 8 June 2015 on a European Resettlement Scheme. 
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mitments from 20 July 2015.67 Any further need for resettlement would be carried out 
under another voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54,000 persons.68 
The fact that the pledge by the Member States to commit to the resettlement of 
20.000 people was taken by the Representatives of the Member States underlines that 
resettlement is considered a voluntary act by the individual Member States. This seems 
to be confirmed by the General Court’s conclusion that the EU-Turkey Statement was 
really an agreement between the Member States and Turkey, rather than between the 
EU and Turkey. However, in the period following the conclusion of the “deal”, it was the 
Commission, in close consultation with Turkey and the Justice and Home Affairs Coun-
sellors, that drafted Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the resettlement of Syri-
an refugees under the EU-Turkey Statement69, which were subsequently endorsed by 
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States.70 
What is interesting about the SOPs is that they clearly set out the selection criteria 
for the Syrian refugees that would be eligible for resettlement, essentially replicating 
the UNHCR resettlement submission categories.71 In addition they provide for a num-
ber of exclusion grounds. A Member State may, for instance, refuse resettlement in or-
der to preserve the proportion in overall numbers between the different individual 
submission categories. Moreover, priority is to be given to persons who have not previ-
ously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly.72 The procedure relies heavily upon a 
pre-selection made by the UNHCR, which however does not include a RSD.73 While the 
participating States retain the right to decide on and reject candidates in individual cas-
es, the participating State “should reject a candidate only in case he or she does not 
meet the eligibility criteria”.74  
On the basis of the General Court’s ruling quoted above, as well as the “adoption” of 
the SOPs with endorsement by the Member States, rather than by Council Decision, it 
would be difficult to maintain that the SOPs are binding under EU law. Even under public 
international law, they could only be considered to constitute binding obligations if the 
 
67 EU-Turkey Statement (2016). 
68 Ibid. Any commitments undertaken under that additional framework could be offset against non-
allocated places under Decision 2015/1601, i.e. the places for relocation from Italy and Greece: Decision 
(EU) 2016/1754 of the Council of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601.  
69 See Presidency of the Council, Standard Operating Procedures implementing the Mechanism for 
Resettlement from Turkey to the EU as set out in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, Brussels, 5 
April 2016, Council document 7462/16. 
70 Presidency of the Council, Standard Operating Procedures implementing the Mechanism for Re-
settlement from Turkey to the EU as set out in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 – Endorse-
ment, Brussels, 27 April 2016, Council document 8366/16. 
71 Ibid., p. 4. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
74 Ibid., p. 8. 
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EU-Turkey Statement to which they give effect were to be considered an agreement under 
public international law. Nonetheless, considering Member States’ support for the SOPs, 
they de facto form the regulatory framework within which resettlement under the EU-
Turkey Statement will take place. From that perspective it is worrying that they provide for 
even fewer procedural safeguards than the UNHCR’s resettlement procedure. It is clear 
that the SOPs are not EU law and Member States implementing these therefore escape 
scrutiny under the Charter. Presumably the Charter would apply to the EU institutions 
and agencies if they were involved in their implementation.75 The Charter would also ap-
ply if the SOPs were included in EU legislation, such as in the Commission proposal for a 
regulation establishing a Union resettlement framework of June 2015.76 
iii.3. Proposal for an EU resettlement mechanism 
In 2016, the Commission proposed a regulation to create “a more structured, harmo-
nised and permanent framework for resettlement”.77 It presented its proposal as an es-
sential part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).78 The regulation would go 
further than any prior involvement of the EU in resettlement in so far as it not only pro-
vides for establishing priorities, but also procedures and exclusion grounds, as well as 
the adoption of a resettlement plan by the Council that determines the maximum 
numbers of people to be resettled under the proposed regulation.79 The eligibility crite-
ria in the Commission proposal largely overlap with the UNHCR’s submission criteria.80 
Aside from the exclusion criteria that would exclude a person from refugee status in the 
first place (e.g. for having committed war crimes), there are other – more problematic – 
exceptions, such as the exclusion of anyone who has been irregularly in the territory of 
the Member States prior to resettlement or to whom resettlement has been refused in 
the preceding five years.81  
 
75 Ledra Advertising [GC], cit., para. 67. 
76 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a Union Resettlement Framework, COM(2016) 468 final. 
77 Ibid., p. 2. 
78 Ibid., p. 3. 
79 Ibid., Art. 7. 
80 Ibid., Art. 5. 
81 Ibid., Art. 6. See also the critical opinions of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and 
Social Committee in this regard: Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 25-26 Janu-
ary 2017 on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament 
and the Council’ (COM(2016) 468 final — 2016/0225 COD), 2017/C 125/05, point 2.5; Opinion of the Euro-
pean Committee of the Regions of 8-9 February 2017, Reform of the Common European Asylum System 
Package II and a Union Resettlement Framework, cor.europa.eu, point 27. 
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The proposal provides for both ordinary and expedited resettlement procedures 
for targeted Union resettlement schemes.82 Interestingly, UNHCR or the EASO, under its 
proposed new mandate, may refer to the Member States third country nationals that, 
according to their assessment, fall within the scope of the Regulation.83 In addition, 
UNHCR may be requested to carry out a full RSD.84 Member States are explicitly allowed 
to give preference on the basis of family or socio-economic ties, and can ask UNHCR to 
take into account such considerations.85 The Commission’s proposal states that Mem-
ber States shall make the assessment of whether third country nationals are eligible for 
resettlement on the basis of documentary evidence, a personal interview or a combina-
tion of both.86 There is no duty to provide reasons for negative decisions and there is 
no possibility to appeal negative decisions. Instead it is simply stated that in such event 
no resettlement will take place.87 If the Commission proposal were to be adopted with-
out amendments this would raise important questions in terms of judicial protection 
and good administration.  
iii.4. Applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to EU 
resettlement 
The Commission’s explanatory memorandum contains the by now obligatory statement 
that the Regulation respects fundamental rights.88 It specifically states that it is without 
prejudice to the right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement. At the same time 
recital 19 of the proposal makes it clear that there would be no subjective right to reset-
tlement. The explanatory memorandum furthermore stresses that the proposal does 
not create any right to be admitted to the territory of the Member States for the pur-
pose of being granted international protection.89 The reference to the right to asylum 
and the prohibition of refoulement should therefore be understood as an affirmation of 
those rights solely within EU territory.  
It could be argued that, following the Court’s reasoning in the X and X case, an indi-
vidual who does not fall within the eligibility criteria would not be within the scope of 
the regulation and therefore also outside the scope of the protection of the Charter. 
However, any resettlement taking place under the Union framework would have to be 
 
82 Arts 8, 10 and 11 of the Proposal for a Regulation COM(2016) 468.  
83 Ibid., Art. 10, para. 8; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, 
COM(2016) 271 final. 
84 Art. 10, para. 8, of the Proposal for a Regulation COM(2016) 468. 
85 Ibid., Art. 10, para. 8. 
86 Ibid., Art. 10, para. 3. 
87 Ibid., Art. 10, para. 6. 
88 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
89 Ibid., p. 10. 
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considered to fall within the scope of EU law, in any case after preselection. Although 
there is no right to resettlement, the appropriate comparison would once more be with 
an applicant for asylum, who during her application is protected by the Charter, irre-
spective of whether her claim is ultimately accepted.  
The argument could even be made that the Charter should apply if preselection 
were to be done by EASO. Agencies’ expert opinions must be considered preparatory 
acts and can therefore not be challenged.90 However, the refusal to preselect a candi-
date for resettlement by EASO would effectively close the way to resettlement resulting 
in a de facto final decision. Substantively the same would be true where preselection is 
carried out by the UNHCR, although an UN Agency is of course not bound by the Char-
ter. Whilst this would not in theory exclude the possibility of triggering the international 
responsibility of the UNHCR, neither the Member States nor the EU could be held re-
sponsible for the UN Agency’s actions, as they lack effective control.91 
Assuming that the Charter and general principles of EU law apply in full to the EU’s 
institutions and agencies, as well as the Member States when acting under the Union 
framework, the current proposal must be considered to provide insufficient procedural 
safeguards. The EU framework would even set standards below those of the UNHCR.  
The right to be heard, as part of the general principle of good administration, would 
require that a person considered for resettlement be allowed to make her views 
known.92 That right applies also where the legislation in question does not expressly 
provide for such a procedural requirement, although it does not necessarily require an 
interview.93 Still, the way in which the proposal prescribes that Member States should 
reach a decision on resettlement – on the basis of documentary evidence and/or an in-
terview – would allow a Member State to reach a decision on resettlement without 
hearing the person concerned. Likewise, the absence of a duty to state reasons must be 
considered contrary to the principle of good administration. This duty is moreover 
closely related to the right to an effective remedy laid down in Art. 47 of the Charter 
which, given the absence of the possibility to appeal a negative decision, must be con-
sidered infringed as well.94 
 
90 Consistent case law of the Court of Justice holds that recourse can only be had against the deci-
sion terminating the procedure: Court of Justice: judgment of 11 November 1981, case 60/81, IBM, para. 
12; judgment of 13 October 2011, joined cases C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, Deutsche Post, para. 53. 
91 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in 
Report of the International Law Commission, sixty-third session, 2011, UN Doc. A/66/10 (DARIO), p. 54 et seq. 
92 M., cit., para. 87 and Court of Justice, judgment of 5 November 2014, case C-166/13, Mukarubega, 
para. 46. 
93 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2008, Sopropé, case C-349/07, para. 38; M., cit., para. 
86; judgment of 10 September 2013, G. and R., case C-383/13 PPU, para. 32. 
94 M. RENEMAN, EU Asylum Procedures and the Right to an Effective Remedy, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2014, p. 106. 
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Even if the argument that the Charter applies in full to resettlement activity under 
the Union framework is accepted, it would be very difficult for an individual to challenge 
a negative decision on resettlement, be it on procedural or substantive grounds. In the 
absence of a right to resettlement and in view of the practical predicament in which 
candidates for resettlement will find themselves, access to a judge may be illusory. 
IV. Frontex coordinated joint operations in third country territory 
In the above examples one of the key questions is whether the Member States are act-
ing within the scope of EU law. The final example will look at joint operational activity 
for the management of the EU’s external borders, taking place however within, and with 
the cooperation of, third countries. In that situation it is not the scope of EU law but ra-
ther the multiplicity of actors that makes it difficult to hold executive authority to ac-
count. The involvement of third country authorities adds a layer of complexity to the 
already unclear division of responsibility between EU and Member States’ border guard 
authorities during joint operations. A similar difficulty was touched upon in the preced-
ing section when it was pointed out that it would be impossible to hold the UNHCR, as 
an intergovernmental organisation, to account under the Charter despite the close 
connection between its referrals and Member State decisions.  
iv.1. Frontex as an executive actor 
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, known by the French acronym of its origi-
nal name (Frontex), was initially set up in 2004 with the aim of supporting Member States’ 
joint operational cooperation for the management of the external borders.95 Ever since its 
establishment its tasks and powers as well as its financial resources have been steadily 
growing, most importantly with the adoption of its current legal basis in 2016.96 It is an 
independent agency which currently has three roles: 1) a regulatory role, providing the 
Commission, Council and Member States with technical and situational information relat-
ed to the management of the external borders; 2) a supervisory role, assessing the vul-
nerability of Member States border management systems on a rolling basis and partici-
pating in the Schengen Evaluation System; and 3) an operational role.97 In its operational 
 
95 Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of the Council of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (Frontex Regulation). Its current legal basis is Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG Regulation). 
96 J.J. RIJPMA, Frontex and the European system of border guards: the future of border European bor-
der management, in M. FLETCHER, E. HERLIN-KARNELL, C. MATERA (eds), The European Union as an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 217 et seq. 
97 J.J. RIJPMA, The Proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard: Evolution or Revolution in Exter-
nal Border Management?, Study for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, 2016, 
www.europarl.europa.eu. 
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role, the Agency can initiate, finance and support joint operational border activity as well 
as joint return operations of the Member States’ border guard authorities.98 Despite the 
fact that successive amendments to its founding regulation have given the Agency an in-
creasingly important influence over Member States’ conduct during these operations, it 
does not itself utilise any autonomous law enforcement powers. Instead, national border 
guards from a Member State may exercise a range of law enforcement powers under the 
law of the host Member State in the context of joint operations.99 
iv.2. Responsibility for fundamental rights violations 
Frontex has from the outset been subject to criticism for failing to ensure compliance 
with fundamental rights during joint operational activity.100 Part of the difficulty here 
lies with the unclear division of responsibilities, resulting in the EU’s official stance that 
since the Agency does not dispose of executive powers and only coordinates Member 
States’ activities, it cannot be held responsible for any possible violation of fundamental 
rights.101 Indeed, responsibility for any such violations would primarily lie with the 
Member State hosting an operation, as this is the Member State that exercises com-
mand and control.102 This would be the general finding both under public international 
law, as well as ECHR and EU law. Moreover, Fink has argued that in addition to the host 
Member State participating Member States, as well as Frontex itself, may also incur lia-
bility. This liability is based on the doctrine of positive obligations and incurred for what 
she calls associated conduct, i.e. behaviour that facilitates or fails to prevent foreseea-
ble breaches of fundamental rights.103 With respect to the Agency, this argument is 
supported by the range of obligations that have been imposed upon Frontex to respect 
and guarantee compliance with fundamental rights during joint operations, as well as 
 
98 Arts 15 and 28 of the EBCG Regulation. 
99 Ibid., Art. 40. 
100 See for instance Human Rights Watch, Report of 21 September 2011, The EU’s Dirty Hands: Fron-
tex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece, but also the Decision of the European 
Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (Frontex), 12 November 2013. 
101 See for instance: Frontex, Opinion from Frontex on the European Ombudsman's own-initiative 
inquiry into the implementation by Frontex of its fundamental rights obligations, 17 May 2012, p. 2. 
102 M. FINK, Frontex and Human Rights: Responsibility in ‘Multi-Actor Situations’ under the ECHR and 
EU Public Liability Law (PhD dissertation, Leiden University, forthcoming 2018). 
103 M. FINK, Frontex and Human Rights, cit., passim; R. MUNGIANU, Frontex and Non-Refoulement: The 
International Responsibility of the EU, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 226, argues that 
under public international law, both Frontex and the participating Member States could incur derivative 
responsibility for providing aid and assistance (Art. 14 DARIO and Art. 16 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts – i.e. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 3 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10). 
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the duty imposed on its Executive Director to withdraw financial support, suspend or 
terminate a joint operation in case of serious and persistent human rights violations.104 
iv.3. Fundamental rights accountability mechanisms 
The mainstreaming of fundamental rights in the Agency’s activities initially developed in 
practice and was later codified and reinforced by legislative amendments.105 Frontex is 
now equipped with a Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) and a Consultative Forum, both 
of which contribute to fundamental rights monitoring. Additionally, Frontex has drawn 
up a Fundamental Rights Strategy, adopted a Code of Conduct which sets out behav-
ioural standards for all persons participating in Frontex activities, and has included fun-
damental rights training in the common core curricula for border guards.106  
Upon the recommendation of the European Ombudsman, the 2016 Regulation in-
troduced an individual complaints mechanism.107 This is an important step forward, 
even if its effectiveness will need to be proven in practice. A standardised complaint 
form has been made available on the Frontex website in six different languages, out of 
which four are non-EU languages (Arabic, Urdu, Pashtu and Tigrinya). Any person who 
considers that the action of staff (be they Frontex or national) has resulted in a breach 
of their fundamental rights may submit a written complaint the Agency. The FRO is re-
sponsible for handling these complaints, including determining their admissibility and 
forwarding them to the Agency and/or Member States and ensuring appropriate follow-
up. Yet, despite the increased attention paid to fundamental rights, and the introduc-
tion of the individual complaints procedure, the continuing disagreement over the re-
spective responsibilities of participating Member States and the Agency means that ju-
dicial review, and by extension respect for Art. 47 of the Charter, will not always be 
guaranteed. Not only will there be practical impediments to access to justice, it will also 
be next to impossible for an individual to establish precisely which actor contributed to 
what extent to the violation of her fundamental rights.  
Accountability of the Agency should also not be confused with the civil or criminal 
liability of individual Frontex staff or visiting border guards. In this regard, the 2004 
Regulation merely stated that visiting border guards and agency staff working in anoth-
er Member State than their own would be subject to the national law of that Member 
State.108 In addition, it provided that the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of 
the European Communities would apply to the Agency, meaning that its staff would be 
 
104 Arts 25, 26 and 28, para. 6, of the EBCG Regulation.  
105 P. SLOMINSKI, The Power of Legal Norms in the EU’s External Border Control, in International Mi-
gration, 2013, p. 41 et seq. 
106 Arts 34-36, 70 and 71 of the EBCG Regulation.  
107 Ibid., Art. 72. 
108 Art. 10 of the Frontex Regulation.  
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immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts performed by them in their official 
capacity.109 In 2007, the first amendment to the Frontex Regulation made it clear that 
the civil and criminal liability of the visiting border guards would be governed by the law 
of the host Member States.110 The reference to the criminal and civil liability of Agency 
staff was deleted at that time, whereas the Protocol continued to apply.111 In 2011, an-
other amendment to the Frontex Regulation introduced the provision that visiting bor-
der guards would remain subject to “appropriate disciplinary or other measures in ac-
cordance with its national law” for breaches of fundamental rights.112  
iv.4. Frontex as an external executive actor 
From the outset, Frontex tasks have included the facilitation of operational cooperation 
between Member States and third countries. For that purpose it concludes working ar-
rangements on the management of operational cooperation with the authorities of 
third countries, generally the authorities responsible for border management in those 
countries.113 The 2011 amendment to the Frontex Regulation introduced the possibility 
for the Agency to send liaison officers to third countries and to launch and finance 
technical assistance projects in third countries independently.114 In bilateral agree-
ments with third countries, Member States may include provisions on the role of the 
Agency and the powers of guest officers in the context of joint operations.115 Although 
Frontex has not made much use of these provisions so far, the 2015 refugee crisis and 
the EU’s focus on cooperation with third countries in response, is likely to change that. 
The Agency appointed a liaison officer in Turkey in April 2016 and will shortly designate 
a liaison officer for the Western Balkans.  
Frontex is generally not considered to have international legal personality. Com-
mentators seem to agree that working arrangements are to be considered non-binding 
under public international law.116 In fact, without exception the arrangements contain a 
provision to this effect, confirming the absence of any intention to be legally binding. 
Where the previous version of the Frontex Regulation rather enigmatically stipulated 
that these working arrangement were “to be concluded in accordance with the relevant 
 
109 Ibid., Art. 18. 
110 Current Arts 42 and 43 of the EBCG Regulation. 
111 Ibid., Art. 59. 
112 Ibid., Art. 21, para. 5.  
113 Ibid., Art. 54, para. 2. 
114 Ibid., Arts 54, para. 9, and 55. 
115 Ibid., Art. 54, para. 10. 
116 A. OTT, E. VOS, F. COMAN-KUND, EU Agencies and their International Mandate: A New Category of 
Global Actors, CLEER Working Paper 2013/7, p. 32. 
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provisions of the TFEU”, the current Regulation prescribes that they shall receive the 
Commission's prior approval and that the European Parliament must be informed.117 
The most important innovation that was brought about by the 2016 change of Fron-
tex’s legal basis, is the possibility for the Agency to coordinate operational cooperation 
between Member States and third countries. It may carry out actions at the external 
borders involving one or more Member States and a third country neighbouring at least 
one of those Member States, including on the territory of that third country.118 This 
naturally further complicates the already complex picture of responsibility during Fron-
tex coordinated joint operations.  
In situations where a joint operation includes the exercise of executive powers by 
border guards from the Member States on third country territory, a status agreement 
must be concluded by the Union with the country concerned under Art. 218 TEU.119 The 
status agreement shall cover all aspects that are necessary for carrying out the actions. 
It must be based on a model status agreement, which was published by the Commis-
sion on 22 November 2016.120 The Commission is currently negotiating with Serbia, has 
received a mandate from the Council to start negotiations with FYR of Macedonia and 
intends to present a proposal for negotiating mandates for status agreements with Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.121  
The Model Status Agreement confirms that joint operations in third countries may 
only serve to control those stretches of a third country’s border that are also part of the 
EU’s external border (e.g. the Serbian-Hungarian border) and therefore not those parts 
of the third country’s external border with other third countries (e.g. Serbian-
Montenegrin border).122 This seems in line with the Agency’s mandate, which is limited 
to the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU and 
not the control of irregular migration more generally. It does not, however, exclude co-
operation in other areas of border management covered by the Frontex Regulation. It 
also leaves open the question of whether cooperation with countries on the other side 
of the Mediterranean in the context of sea borders operations would be permissible.123 
 
117 Art. 54, para. 2, of the EBCG Regulation.  
118 Ibid., Art. 54, para. 3. 
119 Ibid., Art. 54, para 4. 
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liament, the European Council and the Council on the operationalisation of the European Border and 
Coast Guard, p. 12. 
122 Art. 2, para. 2, of the Model Status Agreement. 
123 In the judgment of 5 September 2012, case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council [GC], the Court of Jus-
tice left the question as to the geographical scope of the Schengen Borders Code in the context of Fron-
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Like any joint operation, joint operational activity with third countries is based on an 
operational plan.124 Operational plans, detailing the modus operandi of a joint opera-
tion, have been used from the very start of Frontex operations. A first explicit reference 
to the Operational Plan was introduced only by the 2011 amendment of the Frontex 
Regulation. The plan is agreed between the executive director and the host Member 
State, in consultation with the participating Member States. Not until the adoption of 
the 2016 Regulation was the binding nature of the plan made explicit in the Regula-
tion.125 In the external sphere, however, the question of the binding nature of the plan 
arises again, as the Model Status Agreement is silent as to who concludes the opera-
tional plan and what its legal status is.126 
Unlike the Working Arrangement and the Operational Plan, a Status Agreement 
would need to qualify as an agreement under public international law for which the 
Commission’s Model Status Agreement forms a blueprint. When looking at the content of 
the Model Status Agreement it replicates on the one hand the most important provisions 
of the Frontex Regulation, most importantly giving visiting border guards the authority to 
exercise those powers that are required for border control, under rules and regulations of 
the third country and under the instructions of the third country’s border authorities.127 
On the other hand, in stipulating the privileges and immunities of the visiting border 
guards, it replicates the provisions of the EU Status of Forces/Mission Agreements of Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions.128 It essentially provides visiting EU 
border guards with immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the 
third country in respect of acts carried out in an official capacity.129 
 
tex-coordinated joint operations at sea unanswered. It did however seem to imply that rules on intercep-
tion, disembarkation and search and rescue fall within the concept of surveillance. 
124 Art. 16 of the EBCG Regulation.  
125 It does however remain unclear how the operational plan should be qualified under EU law. It is 
not an implementing measure under Art. 290 TFEU, considering that it requires the approval of both the 
Executive Director, representing the Agency and participating Member States. It could therefore more 
readily be compared as a cross-over between an interinstitutional agreement and an agreement between 
Member States. Thanks to Melanie Fink for pointing out this analogy.  
126 Art. 3 of the Model Status Agreement. 
127 Ibid., Art. 4. 
128 Council, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the European Union-led forces between the Eu-
ropean Union and a Host State, 8720/05 Limite, 18 May 2005; Council, Draft Model Agreement on the sta-
tus of the European Union Civilian Crisis Management Mission in a Host State (SOMA), 10564/05 Limite, 
27 June 2005. 
129 Art. 6 of the Model Status Agreement. 
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iv.5. Accountability for fundamental rights violations on third 
country territory 
The EBCG Regulation states that Frontex and the Member States must comply with EU 
law, also when cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory of those 
countries.130 It specifically stipulates that the status agreement shall ensure the full re-
spect of fundamental rights during these operations.131 How does it aim to do so? 
The Model Status Agreement provides that the Executive Director may suspend an 
action in cases of breach of fundamental rights.132 On the one hand the threshold for 
doing so is lower than under the Frontex Regulation, which requires the violations to be 
serious or persistent. On the other hand, it is not an obligation (shall), but a possibility 
(may). The Model Status Agreement further states that each party shall have a com-
plaint mechanism in place.133 Although there is no reference to an individual complaints 
mechanism, it seems that the purpose of this provision is to have a similar mechanism 
as that of the Agency available also in the third country. 
The Model Status Agreement imposes a general duty on all participating border 
guards to fully respect fundamental rights in the exercise of their tasks.134 Participating 
border guards, whilst enjoying immunity from jurisdiction of the third country, are not 
exempt from the jurisdiction of their respective home Member State.135  
All neighbouring countries of the EU, with the exception of Belarus, are members of 
the Council of Europe. They are also all parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, alt-
hough Turkey retains a geographic limitation to its ratification limiting refugee status to 
European refugees. Northern African countries are, for obvious reasons, not party to 
the ECHR. With the exception of Libya, they are signatories of the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion. There is a strong argument to be made for limiting joint operational activity on the 
territory of non-EU countries to members of the Council of Europe. Since the prime re-
sponsibility for breaches of fundamental rights in the context of such operations lies 
with the host State, i.e. the third country, this would at least guarantee the possibility 
for individuals to bring a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights, since 
the Charter and general principles of EU law cannot apply to third countries.  
It would be more difficult to establish the responsibility of participating Member 
States under the ECHR, as this would require that the visiting border guards exercise 
effective jurisdiction in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on 
 
130 Art. 54, para. 1, of the EBCG Regulation. 
131 Ibid., Art. 54, para. 4. 
132 Art. 5 of the Model Status Agreement. 
133 Ibid., Art. 8, para. 2. 
134 Ibid., Art. 8, para. 1. 
135 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 7. 
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extra-territorial application of the Convention.136 Until the EU accedes to the ECHR, 
there is also no possibility to challenge Frontex’s actions under the ECHR.  
The Charter would of course apply in full to Frontex as well as the participating 
Member States as there can be no doubt that they act within the scope of EU law. Un-
like CFSP missions, which are excluded from judicial review on the basis of Art. 24, para. 
1, TEU, joint operational activity in the field of border management is fully within the ju-
risdiction of the CJEU.137 However, the difficulty would be to establish a sufficiently seri-
ous breach that is required under EU liability law, as neither Frontex nor the participat-
ing Member States can be considered to have legal decision-making powers over opera-
tions on third country territory.138 This would not however exclude the liability of Fron-
tex for associated conduct, were it to disregard the options it has to withdraw from the 
operation in case of fundamental rights violations.  
Despite the attention that is paid to the need to respect fundamental rights during 
joint operations in third country territory and the establishment of accountability 
mechanisms, such as the complaints procedure, in practice it may prove difficult to hold 
all actors involved responsible. In both practical and legal terms, the EU and ECHR liabil-
ity regimes do not sufficiently reflect the multi-actor reality in EU external administrative 
action. Moreover, notwithstanding the conclusion of a Status Agreement, Member 
States’ border guards de facto fall under the control and command of a third country 
that is not bound by the EU administrative and fundamental rights safeguards that 
would apply were a joint operation to take place on EU territory. 
V. Conclusion 
The three examples that have been discussed in this Article serve to show that EU ex-
ternal administrative action takes place in a complex reality that involves Member 
States’ authorities, the EU institutions and agencies, as well as third country authorities 
and IGOs, such as UNHCR. Despite a continuing trend to externalise migration and asy-
lum policies, it has become harder for Member States to escape fundamental rights 
constraints by “moving out”, to the extent that they themselves or EU institutions or 
agencies continue to play an active role in the implementation of these policies. 
 
136 Issa et al. v. Turkey, cit., para. 71. 
137 Art. 24, para. 1, TEU. See also Ledra Advertising [GC], cit., para. 67. The limitation of the Court’s ju-
risdiction in Art. 276 TFEU as regards the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police 
or other law-enforcement services of a Member State is limited to judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation. On the exclusion of judicial review of CFSP missions see M. CREMONA, “Effective 
Judicial Review is of the Essence of the Rule of Law”: Challenging Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Measures Before the Court of Justice, in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 2, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 
671 et seq. 
138 See M. FINK, Frontex and Human Rights, cit. 
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First of all, the integration of the Schengen acquis in the EU legal order, the full ju-
risdiction of the CJEU and the recast of Schengen rules as EU instruments, have meant 
that the EU system of judicial protection applies in full. Second, the EU legislator has 
improved the position of third country nationals, either by prescribing the possibility of 
judicial review or by inserting accountability mechanisms that provide for some form of 
redress in case of a violation of fundamental rights. Third, the Charter applies to the EU 
institutions and agencies in whatever capacity or legal framework they operate, and to 
the Member States whenever they act within the scope of EU law, which means that EU 
administrative action continues to be bound by the Charter also outside the EU’s geo-
graphical borders. Importantly, the Charter not only protects classic fundamental rights, 
but also a range of administrative rights, in particular the right to good administration. 
As this Article has shown, these administrative rights may take on a special relevance in 
the context of migration and asylum in which procedural safeguards are key to arriving 
at carefully considered decisions. 
There are however difficulties that remain. The first is inherent in the nature of exter-
nal action and the category of people most likely to be affected: third country nationals 
such as refugees, who are often in a vulnerable position and not able effectively to make 
use of the accountability mechanisms that have been established – without legal aid and 
practical assistance for instance with internet access, translation and even literacy. Sec-
ond, non-judicial accountability mechanisms, as we have seen in the example of Frontex 
coordinated border management operations, are a response to the unclear division of 
responsibilities between different actors. They should however not be allowed to become 
a substitute for a system of judicial responsibility that does justice to the multi-actor na-
ture of EU external administrative action. In particular when cooperating with non-EU ac-
tors, the EU should insist on full respect for fundamental rights also by its partners.  
Third is the notorious difficulty in defining when Member States act within the scope 
of EU law, as illustrated by the X and X case. The question of scope becomes ever more 
important as Member States increasingly resort to coordinated bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation with third countries, outside the framework of EU law. The EU-Turkey State-
ment forms a case in point. Even if the Court were to uphold the General Court’s decision 
that this “deal” is not a measure concluded by the European Council, nor an international 
agreement, in its implementation the Member States must still be considered as acting 
within the scope of EU law when declaring an asylum request inadmissible or issuing a 
return decision. The question of scope is also relevant where the EU decides to formalise 
initiatives such as resettlement, which were previously in the hands of the Member States 
alone, thus potentially bringing them within the scope of EU law.  
Although increased scrutiny of EU external administrative action must at face value 
be considered a positive development, it may also pose some problems. If the applica-
bility of the Charter becomes a side-effect of the EU becoming more closely involved in 
areas previously left to the Member States, it may instill in Member States a suspicion 
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against EU action, hampering initiatives that in themselves are much needed, such as 
the EU Framework for Resettlement. If the full application of the Charter, such as was 
feared in the X and X case, would have disruptive effects on the EU’s visa regime, but 
also put into question the foundations of the global refugee system, unchecked applica-
tion of the Charter would ultimately defeat its purpose. 
